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LEGAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE
EMERGENCE OF QUASI-PUBLIC WEALTH
ROBERT J. LYNNt
"The nineteenth century was characterized
by the expansion of freedom; the twentieth
is characterized by the search for security."1
IT is a commonplace that the face of America is changing. Less familiar
is the fact that the surface changes which are so readily discerned reflect funda-
mental shifts in the underlying political, social and economic structure of the
nation. More particularly, there is no general awareness that property-the
bulwark of the legal order-is changing its form and function in American
society.
Legal rules tend to change slowly, and property doctrines change very
slowly indeed. Just as doctrine affects property form, so too form affects
property doctrine. But change in form may outstrip the evolution of doctrine;
and if such a difference in rate of change remains unnoticed for a substantial
period of time, form suffers, and society with it. Therefore prompt recognition
of significant shifts in form, and careful adjustmenit of doctrine to changing
form, assume at times a critical importance. Now is such a time.
The identification of form, quickened public interest in an emerging form of
quasi-public wealth, some questions posed in adjusting traditional doctrine to
an emerging form, and the impact of shifting property forms on the devolution
of wealth make up the subject matter of this paper.
FORMS OF PROPERTY-OLD AND NEW
In a democratic society where the individual is the focus of attention, it is
only natural that among the various methods of devolution of wealth receiving
general approval,2 the transmission of property from the individual donor to
his natural dependents and successors 3 enjoys the greatest measure of public
tAssociate Professor of Law, Ohio State University College of Law.
1. Kerr, Social and Economic Consequences of the Pension Drive, in NATIONAL IN-
DUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, HANDBOOK ON PmSIONS 83 (1950).
2. In general, the aggregate of claims to wealth devolves from generation to genera-
tion through (1) private arrangements or their equivalents, e.g., inter vivos gift (in trust
or not), testamentary gift (in trust or not), intestate succession, close corporations; (2)
quasi-public institutions, e.g., great commercial corporations, insurance companies, trust
companies, charitable trusts, philanthropic foundations, nonprofit corporations; (3) govern-
ments or their equivalents, e.g., federal, state and local governments holding lands, installa-
tions, monuments or funds, either directly or indirectly (through government-sponsored
corporations).
3. For a description of this particular aspect of the general process, as developtd by
Professor Myres S. McDougal, see LYNN, THE RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES AS AN IN-
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solicitude. Elaborate machinery is available for effectuating the transfer smooth-
ly, with the least diminution of the wealth base and minimum inconvenience
to the beneficiaries. Indeed, the creation, growth and conservation of private
fortune, and its ultimate disposition among claimants-particularly depend-
ents of the donor-are commonly deemed indispensable elements of dynamic
capitalism ;4 and diverse components of society give much attention to increas-
ing the area of freedom within which the phenomenon flourishes-all this
despite the admonition reverberating down through the centuries that man
should not lay up for himself treasures on earth.
The transfer of property from the individual donor to his successors may be
effected in a variety of ways,5 and the techniques of disposition finally employed
are often the result of a careful weighing of time, place and circumstance
by the donor and those specialists who engage in the artful task of maximizing
the realization of today's expectations despite the inexorability of tomorrow's
change. The dispositive devices open to the man of means seem limitless, but
limits there are ;G and it is the draftsman's task to temper the bent of the donor's
STRUMENT OF CO-MUNITY POLICY C. 1 (unpublished thesis in Yale Law School Library
1952).
4. "The ability to make testamentary bequests, . . . is indispensable to the advance-
ment of society in wealth and civilization.... Without this power a man is not the master
of his own fortune . . . ." MCCuLLOCH, SuCCESSION TO PROPERTY 10 (1848). "It is prob-
able that the incentive to work and to save would be very seriously impaired if family in-
heritance were not allowable. . . ." Stamp, Inheritance: Economic Aspects, in 12 Ec'CYCLO-
PEDIA BRITANNICA 356 (1936). But there is dissent. "The first observation to make is that
this argument considers only those who make a fortune and not those who inherit it. It
is also well to note ... that mere productivity is not necessarily conducive to social wel-
fare.... The' argument that men would not work efficiently ... ignores the vast r6le that
non-pecuniary incentives play in men's working lives .... [and] gives to the anticipation
of death a greater r6le than it plays in the daily conduct of most men." ConEaN, The Birth-
right of Esau, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 27, 30 (1933). And Stamp himself writes:
"It may be said.., that the advantages of a system of inheritance from the point of view
of national production rest almost entirely in its psychological influence upon saving....
Stamp, supra at 357.
5. See Scott, Control of Property by the Dead, 65 U. PA. L. REv. 527, 632 (1917).
6. See Scott, supra note 5. The notion that some restraints on freedom of disposition
are justifiable has met with resistance from time to time:
"But though it must be owned that this is a question of much difficulty [a forced
share to the children of the donor], . . . it would seem that the reasoning of those
who argue in favour of the unrestrained power of devising by will is the most satis-
factory. It might, perhaps, be expedient (though we do not lay much stress on the
suggestion) to encroach so far on this principle as to make the fortunes of people
possessed of property, in the event of their dying while their children are in a state
of pupilage, responsible for their maintenance and education till they come to ma-
turity, or are in a condition to support themselves .... But it would be inexpedient
to go farther than this."
'MCCULLOCH, op. Cit. supra note 4, at 13.
"In modern industrialized societies, where the conception of property has become highly
individual ... the tendency has been to leave inheritance as free as possible from regulation
by the state and therefore to extend continuously the right of an unfettered bequest." Cole,
1956]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
desires and create a plan of disposition that carries out to the highest degree
his articulated wishes, yet is sturdy enough to withstand the erosion of a
changing world.
Traditionally, the properties of the donor that have received the most devoted
attention from both his successors in interest and society in general have
consisted of more or less readily identifiable wealth and claims to wealth, tangible
and intangible-land, personalty, monies, securities. The acquisition, retention
and ultimate disposition of material goods is a process of everlasting fascination.
and in the foreseeable future that process will continue to absorb the interest and
energies of innumerable individuals seeking to secure the greatest possible
share in the stake available for distribution. Such individuals will be attended
by a much smaller group-lawyers, accountants, insurers, bankers, economists
-specializing in effecting the distribution in an orderly fashion, minimizing
friction between competitors for goods, and satisfying the demand for certainty,
ritual and recording which commonly accompanies transfers of wealth.
Recognizing the persistence of the traditional is not, however, enough for a
thoroughgoing appraisal of the devolution of wealth as it exists and will prob-
ably develop in the United States. Any realistic survey of the present property
scene must reveal that as the original acquisition of massive material wealth
becomes more difficult, other forms of "property"--often more elusive, more
subtle-become a larger part of the donor's bounty.7 Claims to social security
benefits, participating shares in pension or profit-sharing plans, certificates of
membership in group life insurance schemes-these have already been ac-
corded a place in any complete appraisal of the modern estate.$ Not so easily
fitted into the traditional categories of wealth are the good family name left
Inheritance, 8 Excyc. Soc. Sci. 35, 37 (1932). And imposing restraints is a problem of
no little difficulty:
"If unlimited freedom of inheritance and of bequest are not natural rights, it at once
becomes an important question how they may be limited, and in general the test
applied is that of 'social desirability.' But the definition of what is socially desirable
has proceeded in the past too much upon distinctions as to abstract justice or fair-
ness, and very little examination has been made, or estimate attempted, of the effects
upon production of different practices. Although diffusion of wealth and 'better' dis-
tribution of wealth have been used as reasons for limitation and legal direction, the
economic consequences are not clearly known or distinguished."
Stamp, supra note 4, at 357.
7. "There is one more factor of the greatest moment: the psychological attitude of a
people determines, to a far greater degree than is generally supposed, which goods shall be
brought within the bounds of the price system. In this respect modern capitalism is much
more sensitive and far reaching than, for example, the mediaeval handicraft system. It
might even be said that the commercial-capitalist outlook creates values out of dust....
[T]here is a tendency in the general course of economic development for new objects con-
tinually to be drawn into the sphere of market transactions and price valuation and con-
sequently for the bases of calculable wealth to shift and change." Weyermann, National
Wealth, 11 ENcYc. Soc. Sci. 227, 230 (1933).
8. WORMSER, PERSONAL ESTATE PLANNING IN A CHANGING WoRLD 97-122, 165-71
(6th ed. 1952).
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by a deceased; political, fraternal, professional or union ties that he originated,
strengthened or developed; provision made by him with the family firm for
the apprenticeship of his successor in interest; placement of a favored depend-
ent with a commercial, financial or charitable institution 9 in which the deceased
had influence.' 0 Some of these phenomena, products of power, are undoubtedly
older than their more recognizable counterparts. But such phenomena do not
lend themselves readily to count or measure. Not all can be stored, safeguarded,
divided and transmitted. Consequently, they are easily and frequently over-
looked. Though the power position of the donor has important implications for
his successors in interest, difficulties of valuation may prevent its inclusion in
the itemizing of an estate." Even so, legacies of this impalpable sort have a
place in any accurate survey of the devolution of wealth; and subtleties of
distinction and difficulties of assessment do not justify failure to take full ac-
count of the manifold forms that the valuable takes in a complex capitalistic
society.
However, one need not range far beyond the traditional to detect shifts and
trends in property forms, doctrines and practices. Within the usual categories
of wealth, change has of course been the rule rather than the exception. It is
common knowledge, for example, that as mercantilism displaced feudalism,
the overriding importance of land as a wealth base diminished. Over the
centuries, too, particular property doctrines have emerged, flourished and
died-or nearly so. 1 2 Dispositive devices were invented, utilized and ultimately
discarded.' 3 Property management shifted, bit by bit, from the private indi-
vidual to the impersonal corporation. 14 So it has been, and so it is likely to
continue.
9. "The foundation is a mechanism which has been frequently used to preserve family
control of a family business.. .. " CASEY, LASSER & LopO, TAx PLANNING FOR FOUNDA-
TIONS AND CHARITABLE GIvING, Introduction (1953). "Since the grantor will probably be
in control of the charity through control over the directors or trustees, the inability to
give a direction to accumulate is not ordinarily very important." Id. at 41.
10. Cf. Weyermann, supra note 7, at 228:
"Objects included under national wealth may be either material or immaterial, as,
for instance, advantages of position, of productive efficiency or of monopolistic con-
trol. The decisive feature is that they can command a price in the market and be
converted into money terms."
11. Unless, of course, a continuing business interest constitutes part of the estate, and
even then valuation problems do not necessarily disappear: "[Accounting] authorities gen-
erally disapprove both setting up of goodwill on the basis of history or prospects of high
earnings and the similar writing up of the value of intangibles which had been purchased.
There has been disagreement, however, as to intangible values developed through re-
search. . . . The 'cost' principle would not forbid capitalizing such expenditures, but the
difficulty is in identifying the expenditures which justify ... capitalization. . . ." KArz,
ACCOUNTING 197 (1954). Appraising the assets of a going concern involves consideration
of the power position of the owner whether characterized as "goodwill" or not.
12. An example is the destructibility rule. See SimEs, FUaRE INTERESTS 48 (1951).
13. An example is the ancient use. See MAITLAND, EQUITY 23-42 (2d ed. 1936).
14. "The translation of perhaps two-thirds of the industrial wealth of the country from
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The continuity and inevitability of change make the task of the property
lawyer a difficult one. The draftsman intent on accurate description, prescrip-
tion and prediction with regard to that "euphonious collocation of letters which
serves as a general term for the miscellany of equities that persons hold in
the commonwealth"' 5 must try to identify as precisely as possible the emerging
forms of wealth; the relative position and importance of varying forms; the
probable direction of the changes in form; the rate of change applicable to the
diverse forms; and the political, social and economic forces that affect all these.
He must master the intricate doctrines applied by lawyers and judges in ma-
nipulating the forms. He must be aware of the multiple functions of doctrine
and of the constant confusion of function. And of course he must anticipate
trends, twists and erosions of doctrine.
THE EMERGENCE OF INSTITUTIONAL WEALTH
Popularly, claims to wealth are classed as either "public" or "private," and
for some purposes such a rough breakdown of interests is probably adequate;
for even if interest in refinement of property notions exists, it is not always
feasible or advisable to attempt more accurate description. But for an effective
understanding of the property arrangements of the modern community, the
dichotomy is too rigid. That it endures testifies to a deep-seated aversion to the
refinement of property classifications. That many a charitable institution exists
only at the sufferance of society 16 is ignored. That corporate holdings have a pub-
lic nature is a notion of only comparatively recent origin.17 Allusions to insti-
tutional claims to resources often assume their "private" character even though
institutional claims have grown enormously.
But there are indications that the customary antipathy to clarification of fact
is breaking down. There is to some degree an increasing willingness to ex-
amine familiar institutions and practices in order to determine whether or not
individual ownership to ownership by the large, publicly financed corporations vitally
changes the lives of property owners .. " BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORORATION
AND PRIVArE PR OPERTY vii (1932).
15. Hamilton & Till, Property, 12 ENcYc. Soc. Sci. 528 (1934).
16. "Although organized charity for centuries has been relatively free from surveil-
lance and regulation by government, nevertheless, the! permission to operate is a grant
given by state governments or occasionally by Congress." NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE Docu-
MENT No. 26, at 15 (1954). "It is frequently implied . . . that private benefactions would
cease if it were not for tax exemptions of contributions to and of property of these private
[charitable] organizations. Tax exemption is cited as a necessary incentive to private giv-
ing .. " KILLOuGH, Exemptions to Educational, Philanthropic and Religious Organ ia.
tions, in TAx ExEmPTINs 23, 30 (1939).
17. "Corporations where this separation [of ownership and control] has become an
important factor may be classed as quasi-public in character in contradistinction to the
private, or closely held corporation.. . ." BERLE & MEANS, op. cit. supra note 14, at 5. "It
is . . . misleading to present the vast operations of corporate concentrates as 'private'-
except in the sense that they are not statist.... ." BERLE, THE 2 0TH CENTURY CAPITALIST
REVOLUTION 1.1-12 (1954).
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results attained through them square with objectives sought. That willingness
is evidenced by comment,1 8 discussion and inquiry, both public 19 and private,20
into the ramifications of conventional property devices in the light of modem
requirements. There is, most notably, a sudden upsurge of public interest in
institutional claims to wealth.
The tremendous growth of institutional holdings is a relatively recent phe-
nomenon ;21 the challenge to traditional property notions is relatively new. In a
day when land was the chief form of wealth, and right and duty lay between
man and man or man and God, there was perhaps little need for great refine-
ment of property ideas. Inasmuch as all land was held ultimately of the king,
the public nature of property interests was in feudal days self-evident. And
even as individualism asserted itself, simplicity of classification remained, for
no labyrinth of institutional arrangements had as yet developed to plague the
mind. Acquisition of properties by religious and charitable organizations was
regulated to some degree,22 and in any event public supervision of such holdings
was virtually assured as a consequence of the religious upheaval worked by
Henry VIII.2 3 Use of the private express trust as a wealth devolution device
was confined pretty much to a comparatively small number of landed English
families.2 4 Even when the private corporation eventually emerged to flourish
as the instrument of mercantilism, its evolution was comparatively slow; and
for good or ill, the legal profession assured its predominantly "private" character
18. E.g., Andrews, This Business of Giving, The Atlantic, Feb. 1953, p. 63; Drucker,
The New Tycoons, Harper's Magazine, May 1955, p. 39; Whyte, What Are the Founda-
tions Up To? Fortune, Oct. 1955, p. 110; Wilson, Pension and Profit Sharing Plans-A
Field for New Trust Business, TRUST BULL., Nov. 1953, p. 20; Wynn, Charitable Or-
ganizations, 92 TRUSTS & ESTATES 762 (1953).
19. E.g., Committee on the Law and Practice Relating to Charitable Trusts, Report,
Cm . No. 8710 (1952) ; Hearings Before the Select Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt
Foundations and Comparable Organizations, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1953) ; H.R. REP. No.
2514, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1953) ; Hearings Before the Special House Committee to In-
vestigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organizations, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1954) ; H.R. REP. No. 2681, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954) ; STRAUB, WHOSE WELFARE? A
REPORT ON UNION AND EMPLOYER WELFARE PLANS IN NEW YORK (1954).
20. E.g., ANDREWS, ATTITUDES TOWARD GIVING (1953); ANDREWS, CORPORATION
GIVING (1952); ANDREWs, PHILANTHROPIC GIVING (1950); DEARING, INDUSTRIAL PEN-
SIONS (1954) ; FISCH, THE CY PRES DOCrRINE IN THE UNITED STATES (1950) ; FLFN-NER,
FUNDS AND FOUNDATIONS (1952); KIGER, OPERATING PRINCIPLES OF THE LARGER FoUN-
DATIONS (1954); TAYLOR, PUBLIC AcCOUNTABILITY OF FOUNDATIONS AND CHARITABLE
TRUSTS (1953) ; THE MANUAL OF CORPORATE GIVING (Ruml ed. 1952).
21. ANDREWS, PHILANTHROPIC GIVING 90 (1950); BERLE & MEANS, op. cit. supra
note 14. at 10-17; DEARING, op. cit. supra note 20, at 30-65.
22. HIGHmORE, HISTORY OF MORTMAIN 12-23 (2d ed. 1809) ; HOLDSWORTH, HISTORICAL
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAND LAW 109 (1927).
23. KIGER, op. cit. supra note 20, at 19.
24. Common sense would so suggest, and authorities indirectly substantiate the notion.
4 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 475 (1924); RADCLIFFE, REAL PROPERTY LAW
101-14 (2d ed. 1938).
1956]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
until nearly the end of the nineteeth century 2  without undue strain on tra-
ditional property doctrines.
As the pace of the Industrial Revolution quickened in the United States, the
nature of the corporation changed. The flourishing family firm, with stock
closely held, was swallowed up in the great corporation, with ownership di-
vorced from effective control.26 Former owners of small businesses became
salaried employees within industrial empires, and millions of workers-immi-
grants disgorged at eastern ports and farm laborers attracted by high wages
-flocked to factories in urban areas. 27 The social consequences of this revolu-
tionary economic change are still with us. One of them, the sense of insecurity
engendered in the individual by his integration into an unthinking, impersonal
production machine, found expression not only in the movement to organize
labor, but also in the effort to enlarge the function of the benevolent societies
that flourished toward the turn of the century.2 8 When the attempts of
government and traditional charity to relieve the plight of the unemployed.
the infirm, the widow and the orphan proved inadequate, unions and fraternal
organizations tried to stem the tide of human misery not only by pressing for
effective legislation,2 9 but by making various welfare arrangements of their
own.
30
There was no leisurely development of the numerous plans for achieving the
Elysian state of security. On the contrary, the movement was characterized by
high, impatient hopes, over-ambitious undertakings, and consequent frustrated
expectations. The waste begotten by poor planning and inept management of the
various vehicles of progress has never been calculated; but it is a fact that the
early attempts of quasi-public associations to meet the demand for certainty in
the ordering of human affairs met with disappointment. 31
The period following the first World War was one of retreat for labor
forces,32 and the quest for security on a mass scale had to await the resurgence
of the union movement toward the close of the second administration of Franklin
D. Roosevelt. Despite occasional set-backs, the power of the unions was assured
at the outbreak of World War II, and a chance combination of factors reinforced
their wartime demands for a share in corporate profits beyond the mere in-
crease of wages. 33 As a result of union pressure, corporation after corporation
25. BERLE & MEANS, op. cit. supra note 14, at 13.
26. Id. at 2.
27. DULLES, LABOR IN AmERICA 96-99 (1949).
28. 1 BACON, BENEFIT SOCIETIES AND LIFE INSURANCE §§ la-4 (3d ed. 1904) ; O'DoN-
NELL, HISTORY OF LIFE INSURANCE IN THE FORMATIVE YER.s 624-32 (1936).
29. Person, Industrial Welfare Work, 15 ENCyc. Soc. ScI. 395, 398 (1935).
30. PETERSON, A-MERICAN LABOR UNIONS 179 (2d ed. 1945).
31. HUEBNER, LIFE INSURANCE 379 (4th ed. 1950) ; O'DoNNELL, Up. cit. supra note
28, at 628; Buckmaster, Union Philosophy on Pensions, in NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CON-
FERENCE BOARD, HANDBOOK ON PENSIONS 75 (1950).
32. DULLES, op. cit. supra note 27, at 242-63.
33. "The great spawning of plans first came in the fall of 1942. The urgent wartime
pressure to expand production led to a wild hunt for manpower, but the raising of wages,
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during and after the war made welfare concessions undreamed of in an earlier
day. Unemployment compensation benefits secured in the mid-thirties were
complemented by health, profit-sharing and retirement benefits broad in scope
and generous in amount. The sense of security hitherto available only to the
man of means came within the grasp of the most powerful segment of the em-
ployee class-the organized. A product and a gauge of the success of the long
struggle for security is the spectacular increase in welfare funds over the past
ten years.34 A new institution, with massive claims upon the resources of the
community, has emerged to join the great corporation as a phenomenon of the
twentieth century.
Although the social effects of mass consumption of security are yet unknown,
it is clear that the ferment of the past few decades has major implications for the
law and the lawyer. For the new claims to wealth do not fit comfortably into the
traditional patterns. They are neither public nor private, but quasi-public: quasi-
public because whatever the device enveloping the claim, whatever the doctrine
applied to the device, whatever the institution and the practice through which de-
vice and doctrine achieve meaning, the theme of public interest runs through them
all. As a group, quasi-public institutional claims have received little attention
from the lawyers: despite the flood of comment on the activities of great commer-
cial corporations, charitable trusts and nonprofit corporations have existed for
years in relative obscurity. Now such comparatively old property devices are be-
ing increasingly used, and used in new and unfamiliar ways. There is, for in-
stance, an increased utilization of the trust by groups who cannot be identified
with the beneficiaries of the traditional charitable trust, and who are equally alien
to the old family settlement. If these new developments have not been syste-
matically dealt with by the legal profession, they have at least caused consider-
able unease in the public at large. The reasons for this unease will bear ex-
amination.
the customary lure extended to attract additional employees or retain those currently on
hand, while not prohibited, was inhibited. Many companies, with profits to spare, estab-
lished pension plans-the current cost in the face of excess-profit taxes was nominal....
"What was at first voluntary, if induced, later became coerced.... When the Fedetal
Government ... completed the Krug-Lewis agreement in May, 1946, pension and welfare
plans became a bargaining issue par excellence....
"Then in April, 1948, . . . the [National Labor Relations] Board ruled . . . that 'wages
and other conditions of employment' included pensions; and henceforth employers must
bargain about them. Finally in September, 1949, the steel fact-finding board... submitted
its recommendations that the basic steel companies and the United Steelworkers of America
bargain on pensions. ... " Kerr, supra note 1, at 83-84.
34. "[B]anks in this state [New York] at the end of September, 1955, held $7.5 billion
of these funds. This constituted almost 60 per cent of all such trusteed funds in the United
States." MOONEY, PENSION AND OTHER EMPLOYEE WELFARE PLANS-A SURVEY OF FUNDS
HELD BY STATE AND NATIONAL BANKS IN NEW YORK STATE i (1955). "The pension funds
of U.S. corporations at the end of 1954 are estimated to hold $11.2 billion of assets accord-
ing to a survey undertaken recently by the Securities and Exchange Commission." Cor-
porate Pension Funds, 1954, SEC Statistical Series Release No. 1335, Oct. 12, 1955.
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QUICKENED PUBLIC INTEREST IN QUASI-PUBLIC WEALTH
In 1935 Congress passed the Social Security Act. Some twenty years later
important segments of Big Industry, under bludgeoning by Big Labor, capitu-
lated to the Guaranteed Annual Wage.35 Both the adoption of social security
legislation by government and the acceptance of wage responsiblity by industry
have been hailed as landmarks of progress in this country,36 but without de-
tracting in the least from the very considerable importance of these phenomena,
one can view them as something less than monumental and as something more
than isolated. The deferment of claims to current consumption in exchange
for a "right" to future consumption is not new. The entry of government into
schemes for the care of the old and the dependent was both preceded and ac-
companied by welfare legislation of a less comprehensive kind. The push by
the labor unions for a guaranteed wage followed a fifteen-year battle for accept-
ance of insurance, health, pension and welfare plans. It was not, then, the
novelty of social security or the guaranteed wage that won them unique recogni-
tion; rather, it was the aura of drama surrounding their emergence. Did the
opinion of Lord Nottingham in The Duke of Norfolk's Case37 kick up a com-
parable storm? Probably not. Yet in the field of property law that case is
regarded-and properly so-as a landmark.
If it is true that deferment of current consumption in exchange for a claim
to future goods is not a new phenomenon, then what accounts for the furor
aroused by the extension of social security benefits to new categories of claim-
ants,38 or adoption, in principle at least, of the guaranteed wage? Some readily
verifiable causes for apprehension can be identified. But to a large extent the
factors influencing opinion can only be hypothesized, for they lie embedded
in legal, economic and social attitudes not yet subjected to extensive study.
For exampl, it is undoubtedly true that the number of persons initially
affected by the enactment of social security legislation was in itself enough to
warrant widespread discussion of the program adopted by Congress. Salaries
and wages of millions of persons were subject to deductions. Contributions
were exacted from employers. The cost of administering the plan ultimately
fell on the general public. Naturally, heated discussion of the merits and de-
ficiencies of the measure were commonplace.
By way of contrast, how many persons were immediately affected by the
opinion issued by the Supreme Court of the United States in Nichols v. Eaton I"
35. It is sometimes said that what labor garnered in the bargaining of 1955 was nut
guaranteed, was not annual, and was not a wage. For the purposes of this paper, the con-
troversy over word-choice may be ignored.
36. But not universally so. For a succinct statement of the usual arguments advanced
against acceptance of the guaranteed wage principle, see Slichter, Labor's New TVictory,
The Atlantic, Sept. 1955, p. 63.
37. 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1682).
38. Cf. Bigger Benefits for 75 Million People, U.S. News & World Report, Sept. 3,
1954, p. 44.
39. 91U.S. 716 (1875).
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-the case that gave impetus to the spendthrift trust in this country,40 and
that set John Chipman Gray to writing his celebrated book Restraints on
Alienation ?41 Despite Gray's forebodings of dire results to follow, acceptance
of the spendthrift trust apparently aroused no particular apprehension outside
the legal profession; and such trusts are now valid in nearly all the states.4 2
Whatever are the reasons that prompted judicial recognition of disabling
restraints on equitable life interests, it is self-evident that when the character-
istics of a device hit upon to care for dependents and successors are shaped
in comparative obscurity, when its acceptance of rejection is determined by an
isolated professional group, when its utilization is confined to a relatively small
proportion of the population, it is not at all remarkable that no stirring contro-
versy surrounds its emergence. But when the devices embodying claims to
future goods are hammered out by legislatures or by union-management teams
working in the glare of modern communications systems, public interest must
inevitably be caught up in the solutions arrived at.
General interest in quasi-public wealth has then been awakened by the dra-
matic emergence of new claims to the resources of the community. Furthermore,
outright uneasiness has been provoked in some quarters by the very size of the
"funds" accumulating under the innumerable retirement, pension, profit-sharing
and health and welfare plans. Many call for a deduction from current salaries or
wages, to be matched in many instances by the employer. This deducting and
matching process has produced an aggregate of funds mounting into billions of
dollars ;43 and it has given rise to a plethora of political, legal, economic and
social questions-questions that might have remained unasked were the public
interest less apparent. These are, moreover, questions that bench and bar must
be prepared to help answer-perhaps have already been called upon to answer.
Representative but by no means exhaustive of the problems raised by the
new quasi-public institutional claims are the following. Precisely what place
should be accorded the aggregate of claims in the channeling of capital in-
vestment? Traditionally, we have tended to insist that the private insurer and
the fiduciary invest somewhat conservatively. Is it wise to require that the
managers of the newer forms of quasi-public wealth shy away from the "specu-
lative," even though choice among traditional investment outlets is in fact
restricted, and even though inflation proves, in the long run, to be "normal"?
Xlhatever the legal rule, should it be permissible by appropriate language
in the "indenture," "contract," "articles" or "policy" to free the managers
from the usual restrictions? Should legal reg-ulations governing the laying out
of funds be reformulated or modified in order to make doctrine reflect economic
reality? If so, what rule-making body is best fitted to effect the adjustment of
legal rules? If the emerging forms of quasi-public wealth to some degree pro-
40. See GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS § 29 (2d ed. 1947).
41. GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY iii (2d ed. 1895).
42. GRISWOLD, op. cit. supra note 40, § 58.
43. See note 34 supra.
1956]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
vide "venture" capital, should public funds be withheld from the investment
field ?
Providing satisfactory answers to such political and economic questions
inescapably requires the solution of more peculiarly legal ones. What legal
status ought to be given the managers of the funds? Is their position compar-
able to that of the trustee of the private express trust? Is it like that of the
trustee of the traditional charitable trust? Or is it more akin to that of the direc-
tor or the manager of a private corporation? To what degree should legal
status turn on the device adopted for effectuating company or union policy?
In view of the considerable economic power concentrated in the hands of the
managers, should the legislatures or courts attempt to delineate a unique stand-
ing for the administrators of quasi-public wealth? Further questions readily
suggest themselves, 44 and indeed some have been seeking satisfactory resolu-
tion for a fairly long time.45
Whether or not the misgivings about the rise of institutional wealth are
well founded is largely a matter for speculation. It may be that historically,
fears engendered by spectacular accumulations of funds have in the long run
proved groundless. 46 But the conditions under which previous accumulations
have developed, and their rates of growth, were not the same as those to be
found today. Therefore our natural tendency to evaluate change on the basis
of past experience might prove misleading. And yet the facts necessary for
effective prediction are not available.
This very uncertainty regarding the effects of the emergence of quasi-public
wealth is yet another source of disquietude. Any shift in property arrange-
ments has repercussions unforeseen; and the more abrupt the change, the
greater the likelihood that it will be resisted-that trends dimly discerned
will be viewed with apprehension. In this land of polls, surveys and endless
statistics there is little in the way of verified information concerning the political,
social and economic consequences of the recent massive changes in property
arrangements. However, prediction may be essayed, even though some of it
inevitably borders on sheer speculation.
POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE EMERGENCE OF
QUASI-PUBLIC WEALTH
The Impact of Forced Saving
To the extent that there is a forced deferment of current consumption of
goods and services in exchange for a claim to future consumption, freedom
44. E.g., Has the growth of welfare funds had an appreciable effect on the mobility of
workers? Will pension plans be used by company, union or both to induce worker con-
formity? Will extension of pension coverage discourage expansion of the federal social
security program?
45. The "vesting" in the employee of the employer's contribution to a pension plan is
a matter of common comment in welfare and pension fund literature. For difficulties in-
herent in the use of the word "vest," see GRAY, THE Rui. AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 108
(4th ed. 1942) ; LEACH, FuTuRE INTERESTS 255 (2d ed. 1940).
46. Id. at 815.
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of choice is reduced. Whether one wants to or not, he must forego present
use or disposition, and accept instead benefits keyed to loss of earning power
or early death. Provision for old age, or for one's dependents and successors,
must be made during the productive years, as a social obligation.
If it be conceded that from the standpoint of the community some forced
saving on the part of each of its members is desirable, how far can society go
before the benefits sought are overshadowed by mischiefs unforeseen? Although
it is unlikely that deferred claims will in the immediate future quantitatively
exceed the balance awarded the individual for current consumption, it is un-
deniable that proportionately they are on the increase. And if the tax on
current income exacted by government continues to increase there is the
possibility that in all ranges of income except the very high, voluntary saving
may at some time be markedly restricted, with economic and social consequences
of which the following are suggestive.
First, familiar sources of capital might suffer, at least temporarily. The role
presently played by the savings institution, the investment house and the
private insurer in providing credit for economic expansion, particularly at the
local level, is an important one. But the ability of these institutions, as present-
ly constituted, to continue such service is peculiarly dependent upon the
voluntary investment of some portion of current income by innumerable salary
and wage earners. To the degree that voluntary saving is diminished, the
function of the institutional investor is jeopardized. 47 Further, great corpora-
tions-prime targets in the pension drive-rely heavily on retained earnings
to finance plant expansion. 48 Currently, as commentators delight in pointing
out,'4 federal tax statutes virtually insure that the ultimate burden of corporate
contributions to welfare funds falls largely on the general public. Should the
favorable tax structure change, with the result that the final incidence of the
welfare contribution was switched to the corporation, the drain on profits might
prove too heavy, the growth of retained earnings be stunted and self-financing
dwindle. If the impact of forced saving were felt heavily by both employer
and employee, the newer forms of quasi-public wealth as a source of capital
(and consequently of power) might attain a commanding position.50
Second, an unintended combination of forced saving, on the one hand, and
high income, gift, estate and inheritance taxes on the other, could have un-
expected effects in the long run on freedom of testation and the institution of
47. Dearing suggests that the prospects of receiving an industrial pension will not
basically alter the financial programs of those with well-defined savings habits. EARING,
op. cit. supra note 20, at 174.
49. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAITALIST RM'OLUTION 37-40 (1954).
49. BOvCE, How To PLAN PENSIONS 167 (1950) ; COCHRAN, SCIENTIFIC EmPLOYEE
BENEFIT PLANNING 5 (1954).
50. Dearing suggests further possibilities:
"If the excess supply of money savings should become chronic, a variety of serious
situations might be expected to develop. The most disturbing perhaps would be the
emergence of a significant disparity between the capacity to produce and to consume.
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inheritance. Freedom of testation is a relatively new phenomenona 1 confined
in highly consequential usage to a small proportion of the population, 2 and
nearly always subject to restrictions of one kind or another. But its very
existence presupposes both the availability of something to give and consider-
able discretion for the donor in designating the objects of his bounty. Obviously.
if acquisition of surplus income is made inordinately difficult, and the levy on
its transfer to dependents and successors set too high, freedom of testation
will become an empty concept. Further, to the extent that benefits receivable
under welfare plans are available only to members of a rigidly defined class,
freedom of choice in designating the objects of one's bounty is reduced. It is
commonly assumed that the abolition of inheritance spells the end of class
and the advent of socialism;53 but that thesis rests on overly narrow notions
about the valuable, and assumes a stability of institutional arrangements that
probably does not exist. Nevertheless, any substantial impairment of the
process means a striking change in the devolution of wealth as we have known it.
Government Regulation
Another, perhaps more immediate, effect of the growth of quasi-public wealth
is likely to be that pressure for government regulation of retirement, pension,
profit-sharing and health and welfare funds will become irresistible. Whatever
the event or series of events that will spark government intervention. the
ultimate area of vulnerability remains the same: inherent weaknesses in many
of the plans themselves. Since they are often hastily drawn, some schemes are
subject to manipulation and abuse.54 If abuses became rampant, no crisis
in the general economy would be required to force drastic revision or even
abandonment of a plan, with inevitable defeat of the reasonable expectations of
the beneficiaries. And if a plan were financially unsound at its inception, in-
ternal changes within the organization of the employer-participant, or within
the industry of which the employer is a part, could spell disaster for the fund,
even though the general economy remained sound and stable. The occasional
failure of an isolated fund covering very few persons is likely to go unnoticed.
But a rash of difficulties affecting millions vould swell to a shriek the call
for supervision which already has been sounded1 5
This occurred in the 1920's . . . and was a primary factor in the speculative boom
and subsequent collapse....
"The second possible consequence of surplus savings would be to increase the long-
run money cost of maintaining industrial pensions ......
DEARING, op. cit. supra note 20, at 210.
51. COHEN, The Birthright of Esau, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 27. 29 (1933).
52. Cole, Inheritance, 8 ENcYc. Soc. So. 35, 39 (1932).
53. Id. at 42.
54. STRAuB, op. cit. supra note 19, at xvii-xviii; Senate Subcommittee on Welfare and
Pension Funds, Interim Report, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
55. STRAUB, op. cit. supra note 19, at 139-49; Wallis, Pension and Profit Sharing
Trusts, 94 TRUSTS & ESTATES 841 (1955). See Senate Inquiry Urges U.S. Check on Books
of All Welfare Funds, N.Y. Times, April 1, 1956, p. 1, col. 1.
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Once the decision to regulate becomes irrevocable, an agency must be selected
to do the job. As has so frequently been the case in the past, choice may go
by default; but whatever the election, the difficulties confronting any agency
undertaking surveillance of a miscellany of plans will be great. Skills developed
by the legal profession in developing satisfactory administrative machinery
under comparable circumstance will be called into play once again as the regu-
latory movement gets underway.
Of the consequences to be expected from regulation, one in particular will
le of interest to the property lawyer. It is likely that as the role of legislative
and administrative directives becomes more important in the field of social
welfare, the great variety of device and detail encountered in retirement,
pension, profit-sharing and health and welfare plans will disappear.56 Per-
missible channels for the investment of funds will be delineated. The classes
and the claims of participants and their dependents will become more or less
uniform. The present widespread experimentation in form and function will
be a thing of the past.
The period of transition from comple.city to relative simplicity may be either
confused and chaotic or calm and orderly. But in any event, the role of the
legal profession in channeling the change is obvious. For generations lawyers
have had the task of reformulating the ill-expressed notions of donors in order
to effectuate intention and minimize disappointment among beneficiaries. In
undertaking the equally exacting but even more important task of reconstituting
diverse plans for the care of dependents and successors on a mass scale, bench
and bar will be continuing a work already familiar, but on a larger scale of
importance for the community at large. The opportunity to render a public
service in the property field will be unparalleled. That the legal profession
will seize the initiative is, however, doubtful. If present trends continue, the
services of the lawyer will be sought-after the important decisions have been
made.
Decline in the Lawyers' Leadership
For another effect of the emergence of this new quasi-public wealth is a
further passing of power from judges and lawyers to legislators, administrators,
trustmen, insurers, labor leaders, labor relations counselors, and so on. Un-
fortunately, the drift is not new5 7 Legal historians suggest that for many
centuries the designing and developing of property devices, doctrines, and prac-
tices were pretty much left to the legal profession.5 Certainly many a plan for the
care of dependents and successors was frustrated by failure to conform to the
56. Standardization of clauses in insurance policies is attributable in part, at least, to
government regulation of the insurance business. A purchaser of insurance buys, in effect,
what the insurer has decided to sell as modified by what the regulatory body says the in-
surer must sell, if he sells at all. As Vance epitomizes the notion: "a policy of insurance
is a contract of 'adhesion.'" VANCE, INSURANCE 243 (3d ed. 1.951).
57. See BRADWAY, THE BAR AND PUBLIC RELATIONS 56-64 (1934).
58. 7 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORy OF ENGLISH LAW 355, 384-87 (1926).
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legal formulae worked out by English conveyancers and their counterparts
on the bench.59 Even in the United States the pre-eminence of the lawyer in
property matters was assured until about the end of the nineteenth century.
But with the shift from an agricultural to an industrial economy, with the
rise of the metropolitan community, and with the increased utilization of the
corporate form of organization, the importance of land law declined.6" Its
attenuation was accompanied by a partial transfer of legal functions from the
lawyers to otheroemerging professional groups. Heads of families seeking se-
curity for dependents turned to insurers for advice and counsel. Businessmen
vexed by financial problems sought out their accountants. The family lawyer
of familiar fiction all but disappeared.
That is not to suggest that lawyers have had no part in the creation and
development of the manifold plans for security advanced during the past
fifty years. But it is probably demonstrable that their role in that connection
has not been a dominant one. Perhaps as a group they prefer that the policy
decisions be made by community groups closer than they to the pulse of popular
will, even though it is inevitable that the legal profession will be called in to
add flesh to the skeletal schemes designed by others. But the fact remains
that judgments affecting property arrangements of innumerable individuals
have been made-and will be made-far outside courtroom walls and lawyers'
chambers, by men with little knowledge of legal doctrine, and perhaps even
less in the way of respect for it.
The Tax Structure
A consequence of the publicity surrounding the appearance of union welfare
funds is a growing public awareness of the close relationship between the tax
structure-federal, state and local-and the evolution of all forms of institu-
tional wealth--corporate, union and philanthropic. Commercial corporations
have been granted tax preferences only sporadically, whereas charitable trusts
and nonprofit corporations have been accorded favorable tax treatment more
or less continually.61 The federal tax statutes designed to promote the multi-
plication of union-sponsored security arrangements 6 2 are perhaps results of the
59. For a brief discussion of the rules established in some classic cases, see Leach,
Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARv. L. REy. 638, 642-46 (1938).
60. ABRA11S, REVOLUTION IN LAND 28 (1939).
61. "Tax" exemption at an early date led to restrictive legislation affecting charitable
institutions. The impact of feudal incidents such as wardships and marriages (roughly
comparable to modern inheritance taxes) could be evaded for a time by conveyances in
mortmain. As Holdsworth put it: "If a man gave land to a religious corporation the lord
got a tenant who never died, who was never under age, who could never marry, who could
never commit felony." HOLDSWORTH, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAND LAw 109
(1927). Consequently, statutes were enacted from time to time preventing unauthorized
alienations in mortmain. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COIMON LAw 510 (4th
ed. 1948) ; PLUCKNETr, LEGISLATION OF EDWARD I 94-102 (1949).
62. E.g., Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23(p), 53 STAT. 15 (now INT. REy. CODE OF 1954,
§ 404) ; Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 165, 53 STAT. 67 (now INT. Ra,. CODE OF 1954, § 401).
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notion that movements for the relief of the poor, the sick and the orphaned
are to be encouraged; but whatever the origins of the preference, welfare funds
are in large part accumulated with funds otherwise payable to the Treasury.63
Whether the indirect subsidization achieved through the tax exemption and
deduction devices should be extended, restricted or abolished depends, of course,
on the social utility of the activities pursued through institutional wealth. With
increasing government demands for additional revenue, it becomes important
in the interests of both the individual bearing the tax burden and the govern-
ment seeking additional tax resources to define the objectives of government
policy and to determine whether or not a rational and consistent tax structure
has emerged from the random development that has characterized the emergence
of quasi-public wealth. Obviously, modification of policy ought to proceed
against a background of fact; and thoroughgoing surveys of institutional hold-
ings in this country simply do not exist.0 4 Any broad attack on the whole
problem of indirect contributions to institutional ventures must await the
gathering of data not now available.
Charities in the Shadow
Another development in the property field has been plainly discernible for some
time. There is still a continual quantitative increase in philanthropic holdings,6 5
but as the place accorded the newer forms of quasi-public wealth broadens,
activities traditionally called "charitable" are being confined to ever-narrowing
channels, and in some areas displaced altogether. For example, the orphan has
been, and continues to be, the object of organized charity. But to the extent
that the new welfare funds provide for dependents and successors of a partici-
pant so that the family group remains intact on the death of the breadwinner, the
objects of traditional charity are reduced in number. There is much charitable
work still done among the old and the infirm, but similarly, to the degree that
retirement and illness benefits are made available under the multifarious se-
curity plans now in operation, the necessity for calling on organized charity is
obviated. It may be, in sum, that traditional charity will eventually be forced
into a relatively insignificant role; in the future, charitable activity in this
country may be confined to religious and educational undertakings.
But should the range of charitable operations remain comparatively broad,
welfare funds will nevertheless have an impact. If abuses in the operation of
welfare funds induce government supervision, in time such supervision is
likely to be extended to other charitable activities. Further, the business-like
characteristics of some of the new schemes may invite traditional charities to
63. See authorities cited in note 49 supra.
64. "It would take years and a real fortune to determine what all units of organized
charity are doing under present circumstances, particularly in view of the lack of account-
ing procedures." Wynn, Charitable Organizations, 92 TRUSTS & ESTATES 762, 765 (1953).
65. In an unpublished report made at the end of a year's study of charitable wealth,
Mr. John E. Sullivan, Research Assistant, Ohio State University College of Law, estimated
the value of philanthropic holdings in the United States at about $30 billion.
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take on an appearance of "efficiency," to avoid unnecessary duplication of
function, and to conform to rather strict standards of propriety. Again, contri-
butions by employers and employees to their own security plans perhaps reduce
to some degree the portion of current income that might otherwise be contributed
to organized charity. A participant storing up for his own future may be less
willing to give for the benefit of those whom he considers to be less far-sighted
than himself. 6 Finally, to close the circle, as the proportion of the newer
forms of quasi-public wealth increases, and transmission of property on a
group basis becomes commonplace, beneficiaries of traditional charity may
one day look upon themselves not as objects of the largesse of others, but as
holders of "rights" in the general wealth of the community.
A LoOK AT THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE
Devolution of wealth on a group basis is not new, even to Anglo-American
law. Some share of all wealth, however small, has invariably been in govern-
ment hands, and the charitable trust is a time-honored institution for passing
property from generation to generation in perpetuity. However, popular com-
mentary and taught law alike have tended to stress transmission of wealth
from the individual to his dependents and immediate successors in interest.
Political and social theory have often assumed that the alternative to private
property is state socialism. Indeed, there is historical justification for empha-
sizing the polarity of state ownership, on the one hand, and individual enter-
prise, on the other. Tyranny has been thought to be the concomitant of the
one; freedom, the inevitable counterpart of the other.
Any thoughtful person will readily concede that community ownership of
some limited share of all wealth is not necessarily bad, and no lawyer cognizant
of the great property decisions would contend that private property doctrines
invariably produce socially desirable results. But the notion is deep-seated that
the traditional arrangements for the transmission of wealth from generation to
generation represent the ideal balance between transfers on a strictly individual
basis and transfers under some communal plan. Any suggestion that the rela-
tive positions of the two systems be changed in any appreciable degree is, in
consequence, likely to be viewed with some apprehension.
But misgivings or no, our democratic society is now faced with a fait accompli:
an evolving system of wealth devolution, more or less an accidental by-product
of the rise of the corporate system of ownership, which partakes of both anti-
thetical systems of wealth transmission; which, despite its formal facade, falls
neatly into none of the traditional categories of property devices; and which
poses political, economic and legal questions that have no pat answers. How did
this phenomenon come upon us unaware ?67 The number of persons affected,
66. More than half of all philanthropic giving comes from low-income groups. AN-
DREWS, PHILANTHROPIC GIVING 56 (1950).
67. "It is of the essence of revolutions of the more silent sort that they are unrecognized
until they are far advanced." BERLE & MEAN.,s, THE 'ODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY vii (1932).
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the size of the funds involved and the publicity attendant upon the emergence
of a new form of quasi-public wealth have assured a higher degree of interest
in evolving security plans than was probably evoked by comparable property
developments of the past. Where were those who would ordinarily detect
property change, predict its drift and suggest its impact upon familiar institu-
tions?
Perhaps a partial explanation for the failure to chart trends and explore
implications lies in the rate of change in forms and practices. Retirement,
pension and profit-sharing plans are not new. But their rate of growth during
and since the second World War has been phenomenal. A people engaged in
shaking off a great depression, fighting a global war and resuming a normal
life in its aftermath have found time for little more than passing speculation
about the funds burgeoning around them. The pace has been too fast. Thought
has tended to be afterthought. For something over two centuries English
jurists sought to delineate the ramifications of the Rule Against Perpetuities.
It is unlikely that comparable luxury will be afforded American judges in
worldng out the intricacies of the security schemes produced by the social revo-
lution of the nineteen thirties.
Then too, attempts to transmit wealth through group arrangements have
followed no consistent pattern. Life insurance companies did not attain their
position of financial strength and economic power through sheer benevolence-
a part of their impetus has always been frankly commercial. The movement
of labor unions into the welfare field was in some respects fortuitous: concern
for dependents and successors of the wage earner has invariably been sub-
ordinate to thrusts for power.
Finally, although change has occurred, not all--or even a large part-of prop-
erty arrangements have been affected. For generations past, in the face of enor-
mous difficulties, individuals have succeeded in amassing wealth and transmitting
it to their successors; and today, despite the cries of outraged taxpayers, they
are still doing so, for neither income nor inheritance taxes are confiscatory.
The thrust of welfare funds has been particularly dependent upon the strength
of organized labor, and many millions of workers, still unorganized, have not
set their sights beyond the mere wage increase. 6s Even where the pressure for
security measures exerted by employee groups has resulted in welfare schemes of
various kinds, the charge on individual current incomes has not been exorbitant,
6S. See Kerr, Social and Economic Consequences of the Pension Drive, in NATIONAL
INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, HANDBOOK ON PENSIONS 84 (1950):
"The impact of any given pension .plan varies enormously from company to com-
pany-much more than changes in wages and hours. The prewar plans were limited
almost entirely to companies with 500 or more employees. There are 5,000 such
companies in the United States, or less than one tenth of 1% of all firms. Ninety-
five per cent of the business firms, or 3,250,000 have fewer than twenty employees.
The large firm, the old firm, the prosperous firm may be able to absorb a pension
plan quite readily.... Not so the many small firms. Even in prosperous years, 5%
to 10% fail annually. ... Adequate financing at the outset.., is beyond the grasp
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whatever may be its effects in the aggregate. The law of property, trusts, wills
and future interests is still taught, studied, re-stated and manipulated; it is
remarkable in its vigor. Therefore, there need be no rush to form battalions
to save private property and the institution of inheritance. Whatever the im-
pact quasi-public wealth will have upon them, their sudden eclipse is not likely.
But even so, it might be well for society to take a thoughtful look at the
trends in property practices, and to consider their implications. Currently, the
difficulties attending the use of the newer forms of quasi-public wealth have a
familiar source: abuse. Virtually no property device has escaped perversion
for long, and it is therefore not surprising that both the commercial and the
nonprofit corporations have been manipulated for questionable purposes. But
reform follows excess, and it is beyond question that both forms of organization
are here to stay. If this is so, it might prove desirable for property lawyers to
reconsider the desirability of continuing to refine still further the legal doctrines
concerning direct restraints on alienation, when all about us the indirect re-
straints worked by institutional holdings of wealth are multiplying at a fantastic
rate. What use is it to rationalize the Rule Against Perpetuities, if large aggre-
gates of claims are to be exempted from its operation by legislative fiat ?6o Making
a studied choice between voluntary saving, on the one hand, and forced defer-
ment of consumption, on the other, is preferable to letting the decision go by
default. Forthright elimination of such corruption as exists in the administra-
tion of welfare funds is likely to be much more effective than alleviation of its dis-
rupting effects. Re-evaluation of encouraging the growth of all forms of quasi-
public wealth through manipulation of the tax structure is certainly in order. The
place of charitable activities in modern society bears exploration in view of
the recent shifts in property arrangements.
And even if we choose to drift rather than to set a course, might not the legal
profession best meet its obligations to society by taking account of the fact that
the old order of wealth devolution is gradually being modified? Quasi-public
wealth has long been with us, but never before has it assumed the relative
of many small firms. Full funding of a pension, which is the only way to assure the
employee security if the company fails, costs approximately $4,000 for one employee
aged forty-five if he is to retire at age sixty-five with a $50 per month pension. The
coverage of workers in industries with a casual labor force is almost impossible."
69. See 6 AmEmcAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 24.61 (Casner ed. 1952). Professor Fratcher
lists a number of states which exempt trusts for employees from their common law or
statutory rule against accumulations. Fratcher, A Half Century of Trtst Law, 93 TRUSTS
& ESTATES 275, 278 n.26 (1954). Cf. Wynn, supra note 64, at 765:
"If the Federal government becomes convinced that organized charity should not
be free from the application of the rules [against perpetuities and accumulations],
the state statutes embodying the rules will become of less and less importance. For
example, under the Revenue Act of 1950 and the Treasury regulations, there is an
inference, if not more, that organized charity must not accumulate its income, if it
is to retain its tax advantages. Few units of organized charity will accumulate large
amounts of income, even though permitted by state law to do so, under these circum-
stances."
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importance that it enjoys today. Might not a greater proportion of our best
legal minds, carefully trained in the property lessons of the past, devote their
talents to recognizing the emerging forms of wealth, to delineating their char-
acteristics, and to making them more serviceable than their traditional counter-
parts? The representative "heir" of the future may well find his inheritance
in the perforations of a tabulating machine card. From the standpoint of public
service, might not formulation of rules governing the transmission of wealth
on a group basis rank with reformation of doctrines dying through desuetude?
The opportunity is surely there. Will the lawyers lose once again to competing
professional groups ?
Whatever the choice of the lawyers, the community of which they are a part
is facing the fact that the young support the old,70 that the strong sustain the
weak, that man is not an island. For however formidable the legal doctrine,
however complicated the institutional arrangement, however impressive the
array of recorders, the share of goods and services allotted each of the living,
and the respect accorded the hand of the dead, are alike charges on the yield
of the productive facilities of the community at any point in time.71 Any rational
arrangement for meeting the demands of old age and the needs of dependents
and successors must take account of that fact.
70. "fore than a third (36 per cent) of the nation's old people have no personal in-
come at all; they are dependent on savings, relatives, friends and charity. Another 38 per
cent receive less than $1,000 a year...." ... 65 and Over, Collier's, Dec. 9, 1955, pp. 32, 35.
71. See Dean, Accounting for the Cost of Pensions-A Lien on Production, Harv.
Bus. Rev., July 1950, p. 25; id., Sept. 1950, p. 102.
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